INTRODUCTION
Welcome to the constitutional backwater-a place where Rupert Murdoch and Ted Kennedy battle over the Senator's weight and the press baron's ownership of the Boston Herald; where Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas's truthfulness before the Senate Judiciary Committee is challenged by a D.C. Circuit insider; where a regulatory agency hopes its constitutional arguments will be rejected in court and respected in Congress; where President Ronald Reagan alternatively abides by and disregards Department of Justice constitutional interpretations; where President George Bush's regulatory appointees and Solicitor General openly battle each other before the Supreme Court; and where members of Congress perceive constitutional analysis as superfluous. Welcome to the world of the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") circa [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] .
The story begins with the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan. Advocating the substitution of marketplace efficiencies for bureaucratic failures, 1 Reagan appointed communications free-marketeers Mark Fowler (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) and Dennis Patrick (1987) (1988) (1989) to chair the FCC. This changing of the guard, to no one's surprise, did not sit well with the FCC's pro-regulation oversight committees in the Congress, particularly in the House.
2 What is surprising is the vehemence in which congressional leadership expressed its displeasure with the FCC, and the Thanks to Mark Hermann, Randy Springer, and Wendy Watson for research assistance. My interest in this project is a result of their good deeds. Thanks also to Scott Powe and Rod Smolla for their comments on an earlier draft of this article. Last but not least, I am greatly indebted to those FCC officials, congressional staffers, and attorneys who not only participated in the drama recounted in this article but also shared their thoughts with me and my research assistants. LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 56: No. 4 ways in which the Commission sought to advance its deregulatory agenda in the face of countervailing legislative pressures.
This struggle between the FCC and Congress was so fierce during the Reagan years that George Bush's efforts to soothe FCC-congressional relations by naming less confrontational, less ideological nominees accomplished next to nothing? With the election of Bill Clinton to the White House and his naming of Democrat Reed Hundt to chair the FCC, this decade-old war between the Commission and its oversight committees appears to be at an end. This article focuses on the struggle that preceded this promised (if not promising) era of placidity. This retrospective is far from nostalgic; to the contrary, it provides a revealing look at the uses and abuses of constitutional interpretation by an independent agency in its efforts to advance its (de )regulatory agenda.
The FCC saw the Constitution as a political tool to support its deregulatory agenda. When political circumstances allowed the FCC to invoke the Constitution to support its political agenda, the FCC paid homage to the supreme law of the land. When the political costs of advancing its constitutional interpretation were high, the FCC did not abide by its constitutional scruples. The Reagan and Bush White Houses behaved much the same. Fairness doctrine legislation was vetoed by Reagan on constitutional grounds, but constitutional concerns were never raised by Reagan in his approval of race and gender preferences. The Bush White House purposefully selected FCC Commissioners who disavowed Bush Justice Department constitutional interpretations. Congress's approach to constitutional decisionmaking was more cavalier than that of either the FCC or the White House; Congress was simply unimpressed with and untroubled about constitutional interpretation. Congress did not even pay lip service to constitutional concerns raised by the FCC; instead, the FCC was labelled a political malfeasant hiding behind an irrelevant constitutional subterfuge. The courts, finally, were extraordinarily activist in overseeing the FCC: originating FCC policymaking, demanding that the FCC articulate its decisionmaking in constitutional terms, and scrutinizing FCC constitutional arguments. Constitutional decisionmaking by both the U.S. Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals was more readily explained by ideology than fidelity to constitutional precedent.
This article details the features of constitutional politics involving independent agencies through an examination of FCC efforts to repudiate regulatory initiatives designed to facilitate diversity in broadcasting. Part II provides a brief overview of the conflict between the deregulatory FCC and the regulatory Congress. Parts III through VI focus on the particulars of four conflicts between 3. For a discussion of Bush Commission efforts to work with Congress, see infra part V(b). The failure of these efforts is apparent. Energy and Commerce staffer Colin Crowell perceived FCC-Hill relations to be as bad during the Bush Administration as the Reagan Administration. Telephone interview with Colin Crowell (Sept. 25, 1992)(hereinafter Crowell interviews). See also Mark Conrad, FCC Broadcast Rules Review Continues on its Rocky Road, N.Y. L.J., July 24, 1992, at 5 ("persistent criticism from Congress" has made Bush FCC a "wounded, weakened, and embarrassed player in the complex communications law landscape"). the FCC and Congress over the broadcast diversity issue, namely: (1) the FCC repeal of the Fairness Doctrine; (2) FCC efforts to challenge the propriety of its cross-ownership prohibition banning the joint ownership of a television station and a newspaper in a single market; (3) Congress's successful efforts to fight off an FCC challenge to the awarding of preferences to minority broadcasters; and (4) the failure of the FCC and Congress to stop the judicial invalidation of comparable preferences to women broadcasters. Part VII synthesizes the lessons learned from these episodes, and comes to a sobering, but hardly revolutionary, conclusion: Congress, the FCC, the White House, and the courts placed political and ideological preferences ahead of principled constitutional decisionmaking.
II CONGRESS V. FCC: DEFINING THE "PUBLIC TRUST"
Relations between the FCC and Congress are defined by legislative oversight, not statutory mandate. The FCC's statutory mandate-to regulate the use of the airwaves in the "public interest, convenience, and necessity"-is ill-defined to the point of being meaningless. 4 Nearly sixty years old, this open-ended delegation governs virtually all FCC operations. Dramatic changes in the broadcasting and telecommunications industries have not prompted Congress to define more precisely the reach or objectives of FCC regulation. 5 This legislative inertia is neither unusual nor surprising. Congress often prefers policymaking through oversight to avoid the pitfalls of substantive legislation. 6 This reactive role in overseeing agency rulemaking is reflected in the exponential growth of committee staff, the rise of ex parte contacts between Congress and agency heads, the continued utilization of legislative vetoes (even after Chadha), and the use of riders in appropriations legislation to stifle disfavored agency initiatives.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 56: No.4 tions. 8 Unlike permanent authorizations, where must-pass legislative action is controlled by the Appropriations Committees, periodic authorizations enable the FCC's oversight committees to express their preferences and criticisms through reauthorizing legislation and not simply "annoy [ing] ," "seldom ... productive" oversight hearings. 9 Believing that "[r]egular and systematic oversight will increase Commission accountability for the implementation of congressional policy," 10 the House Telecommunications Subcommittee has more than doubled the size of its staff since 1980 to ensure that effective use is made of this reauthorization power.
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Congress's demand that no restrictions be placed on communications from members of Congress to the Commission also reveals congressional efforts to encourage FCC appreciation of the legislative will. In 1987, after the FCC claimed that Commission rules prohibited ex parte contacts with the agency on a matter that has been placed on the Commission's meeting agenda (the "sunshine period"), threats and protests from Congress convinced the FCC that the ex parte congressional contacts were supported by the "public interest for flexibility in exchanging information among policymakers." 12 Congress's desire to protect the continuous flow of information from Capitol Hill to the Commission is understandable. Congressional communications with the FCC have been described by former agency chairs as "powerful and persistent," 13 occurring "about as frequently as television commercials flash across the television screen." 14 Congress jealously guards this prerogative; the White House does not. 15 Ex parte White House contacts during the sunshine period are forbidden.
Congressional efforts to maximize oversight authority, as well as the failure to extend the ex parte exception to White House communications, are especially telling. In the eyes of the FCC's congressional oversight committees, the FCC is deemed an "arm of Congress." This belief is long held and pervasive. Witness House Speaker Sam Rayburn's (D-TX) advice to President Kennedy's FCC Chair Newton Minow: "Just remember one thing, son. Your agency is an arm 8 "Most people would agree," as former FCC Commissioner Glen Robinson put it, "that it is a poor dog indeed that does not know its own master." 21 In a nutshell, that is the Congress's problem with the FCC. Rather than compliantly follow legislative signals, Commissioners are sometimes more attuned to the preferences of the president who appointed them as well as their own personal predilections. Prior to 1980, Congress remained the FCC's master (in name at least) because of presidential indifference in the appointing of Commissioners.
22
The 1980 election of Ronald Reagan changed all that.
Reagan undertook to expand White House influence over the administrative state while simultaneously launching a regulatory relief program designed to eliminate cost-ineffective regulations. One of the principal tools utilized by the Reagan Administration in advancing this deregulatory agenda was appointments to regulatory agencies.
23 Through the appointment of like-minded individuals, as the National Journal observed, Reagan achieved "an uncommon degree of 16 At the FCC and other independent agencies, the President relied almost exclusively on regulatory appointments to make his influence felt. 25 At the FCC, the President's influence was immediately felt.
Mark Fowler, Reagan's choice for FCC Chair, proudly proclaimed that he was part of the Reagan deregulatory revolution. Caricaturing the FCC as "the last of the New Deal dinosaurs" and describing himself as a "conservative populis [ Congress strongly disapproved of Fowler and Patrick's free market philosophy as well as their commitment to put that policy into place through "unregulation." On one level, this dispute was a battle over opposing philosophies regarding the propriety of regulation to serve the public interest. Members of Congress such as AI Swift (D-WA), Edward Markey (D-MA), and John Dingell (D-MI) regard broadcasters "as licensees and trustees of the public airwaves" who may be forced to serve the public interest in exchange for the government's granting them one of a limited number of broadcast licenses.
28
Under this view, the market's inability to compel broadcasters to fulfill their responsibilities as public trustees speaks to "the need for sound, sensible regulations. The dispute between the FCC and the Congress, however, was not simply a question of philosophical differences. It was also a matter of turf. Fowler, Patrick, and other Reagan appointees did not consider themselves beholden to Congress. "For better for worse," as Patrick pointed out, "Congress invested in this commission a great deal of discretion to resolve public policy issues based on public input and our interpretation of the public interest." 31 Congress saw the matter otherwise. Perceiving that its "policy intent was as clear as could be," oversight committee members Swift, Dingell, and Markey, as well as committee counsel Tom Cohen and Larry Irving, perceived that there was no way to "overly manage the commission"; instead, the FCC was "a renegade agency" that needed Congress to step in as an "active participant" and "bring them back. "
32
The war between Congress and the FCC took place on many fields, including telecommunications policy associated with the AT&T divestiture, the obligations of cable television to carry local programming, the proliferation of advertisements on children's programming, the drafting of rules governing network ownership of prime-time television, and a host of issues concerning the ability of the marketplace to produce balanced diverse broadcasting. 33 Congress, although rarely passing new substantive legislation, successfully fought off a great number of FCC challenges to existing regulations. 34 Challenges to the personal attack and political editorializing rules were abandoned, the cross-ownership prohibition was never formally challenged, and FCC rules governing telecommunications access charges as well as network ownership of prime-time television ("fin-syn") were greatly influenced by congressional signals. 35 On these matters, the FCC sought to preserve some political capital with Congress by refusing to fight every possible battle to the bitter end. On other matters, meanwhile, the FCC satisfied its deregulatory appetite. It simplified the process for renewing radio and television licenses, liberalized rules governing multiple ownership of broadcast stations, eliminated the prohibition on trafficking in broadcast lines, discontinued regulation of telephone data processing services, and repealed the fairness doctrine.
36
Battles between the FCC and Congress, in most respects, were not fundamentally different from other Reagan-era squabbles over deregulation. Agencies pushed their deregulatory agenda but retreated when politically 31 Commission, and elsewhere, a great many of the disputes between the FCC and Congress were inextricably linked to First and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of a free press and equal protection of the laws. This linkage was an inevitable consequence of FCC regulations, both restricting the programming decisions of broadcasters and promoting diversity in broadcast ownership through race and gender preferences.
These constitutional concerns added a complex wrinkle to the resolution of disputes between the FCC and the Congress. FCC claims that either the First or Fourteenth Amendments prohibit broadcast regulation seem different in kind than deregulation rooted in cost-benefit analysis. Were Congress to defer to FCC constitutional interpretations, the Commission would have great incentive to cloak its deregulatory agenda in high-minded constitutional rhetoric. Needless to say, the FCC's oversight committees would concede nothing to the Commission. Instead, Congress made precisely the opposite argument, that regulation furthers constitutional values by encouraging broadcast diversity among a limited number of license holders. Nevertheless, the Commission had strong incentive to raise constitutional questions, sometimes because it served its interests in Congress and sometimes because federal court decisions would create an opportunity for the negation of disfavored regulation. The varied ways in which the Commission would raise doubts over the constitutional wisdom of broadcast regulation, and the responses of Congress and the courts to the Commission's constitutional arguments, figured prominently in defining both Commission policy and FCC-congressional relations. These complex "constitutional dialogues" lay at the heart of FCC challenges to the fairness doctrine, the cross-ownership prohibition, and diversity preferences-regulations designed to facilitate balanced and diverse broadcasting. principally symbolic. Although the fairness doctrine was rarely enforced, 38 the fairness battle symbolized the conflict between Congress and the Commission over the propriety of broadcast regulation.
The fairness doctrine dates back to a 1929 decision by t. he Commission's predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission, holding that a radio station's public trustee responsibilities included an affirmative obligation to make certain that a diversity of religious, political, social, and economic viewpoints "find their way into the market of ideas. " 39 This obligation of broadcasters "to encourage and implement the broadcast of all sides of controversial public issues" was formally embraced by the FCC in 1949.
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Ten years later, Congress "statutorily approved"
41 the fairness doctrine. The Congress, however, stopped short of explicitly codifying the doctrine. In enacting legislation largely concerned with preventing bona fide news events from triggering equal-time obligations, Congress included a provision stating that nothing in the amendment relieved broadcasters of their duty "to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance."
42
Broadcasters challenged the constitutionality of government-imposed fairness obligations, arguing that growth in the number of media outlets made "public trust" regulation unnecessary, and that broadcasters should, therefore, be accorded the same First Amendment freedoms as their brethren in the print media. The Supreme Court settled this question in Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, a unanimous 1969 decision that not only upheld the fairness doctrine but defined the diminished constitutional freedoms of broadcasters. 43 The Court, speaking through Justice White, broadly approved of the "public trustee" rationale as a justification for limited forms of content regulation, stating that " [t] here is nothing in the first amendment which prevents the government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of his community and which would otherwise, [ 
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These two cracks lay at the heart of the battle over fairness. Congress thought that the doctrine was codified, and perceived that fairness and other "public trustee" regulations were necessary to combat broadcaster irresponsibility. The Commission doubted the doctrine's codification and, more significantly, thought fairness obligations counterproductive and constitutionally vulnerable. These Commission arguments challenged both Congress's political authority and the propriety of most, if not all, "public trustee" regulations. The Commission nonetheless was cautious in its challenge of fairness. The doctrine was beloved in Congress, and Red Lion's cracks could be filled by a court ruling that fairness was legislatively mandated and constitutionally sound. Fowler, realizing the risks of Congress or the courts turning back a frontal assault on fairness, 47 Specifically, the Report challenged "public trustee" regulations because electronic media properties were no longer scarce. Furthermore, the FCC argued that the fairness doctrine no longer served the "public interest" because it failed in its essential purpose by actually reducing discussion of controversial issues. The Commission, accordingly, "questioned the permissibility of the doctrine as a matter of both policy and constitutional law." 55 The Commission, despite these findings, "determined that it would be inappropriate at this time to eliminate the fairness doctrine."
56 This determination was ostensibly rooted in deference to Congress, namely the propriety of legislative resolution of the issue due to the uncertainty over whether Congress had already "mandated our retention of the fairness doctrine" caused by "the conflicting evidence found in the record" and "the intense Congressional interest in the fairness doctrine and the pendency of legislative [repeal) proposals." 57 The Commission, however, knew full well that Congress would never repeal fairness. Congressmen Dingell and Timothy Wirth (D-CO) glibly remarked in a Washington Post column that they were "consigning [the 1985 Report] The FCC nevertheless launched a quiet revolution with its 1985 Report. Clearly, the political price of direct repeal was too high. The 1985 Report, however, set the stage for judicial repeal of the fairness doctrine. In its 1984 FCC v. League of Women Voters decision, the Supreme Court had indicated that it would be willing to reconsider Red Lion with "some signal from Congress or the FCC that technological developments have advanced so far that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be required." 59 The 1985 Report paid homage to this language, quoting it to show that "the complex constitutional issues presented by the [fairness] doctrine" cannot be settled by "the mere recitation" of Red Lion.ro The Report's detailed conclusions on the "exposure growth in the communications marketplace since the inception of the fairness doctrine" sent a clear signal to the Court that it should reconsider Red Lion. 64. Id. at 517. This conclusion was far from inevitable. Circuit judge Abner Mikva, dissenting to a 6-5 denial of rehearing en bane, argued that Congress "explicitly approved of, ratified and codified the fairness doctrine" and criticized Judge Bork for denigrating the "primacy of Congress as policy-maker" simply because he thought the policy "in error." TRAC v. FCC, No. 85-1160, slip op. 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 16, 1986) (Mikva, J., dissenting). Mikva's attack was prompted, in part, by Bork's comment that fairness "has come under much well-placed criticism for some time and from many quarters." TRAC, 801 F.2d at 509 n.S. the FCC, was certainly welcomed by the Commission. 65 It paved the way for the repeal of fairness in two distinct ways. First, litigants, the Commission, or both, could claim that it would be inappropriate to enforce an administrative doctrine contrary to the public interest. Second, fairness could now be nullified on "public interest" grounds rather than on the constitutional infirmity of an act of Congress as well as a Supreme Court decision.
Direct FCC repeal of fairness remained too costly. In fact, a legislative report (practically, if not technically, binding) accompanying the FCC's fiscal year 1986 appropriations barred the Commission from eliminating or modifying fairness for that fiscal year. 66 Congress's intent that the "Commission shall not change the regulations concerning the fairness doctrine" was also expressed in Congress's statutory demand that the FCC "consider alternative means of administration and enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine and report to the Congress."
67 If it had ignored these pro-fairness sentiments and repealed the doctrine on its own initiative, the FCC would have flouted Congress's will and incurred severe legislative retribution.
The FCC's solution was to craft a litigation strategy so confounding, unprincipled, and politically motivated that the D.C. Circuit, in separate opinions, described it as "curious" and "puzzling."
68 One case, Meredith Corporation v. FCC, involved a broadcaster's challenge to a 1984 FCC finding that Meredith Broadcasting had violated the fairness doctrine by refusing to broadcast programming in response to a series of ads supporting construction of a nuclear power plant near Syracuse, New York. 69 Meredith, not shockingly, claimed that the 1985 Fairness Report eviscerated the doctrine and, consequently, the FCC should formally repeal the doctrine and clear Meredith of any wrongdoing. The FCC opposed Meredith's claim on standing grounds. Noting that no sanctions were imposed because Meredith brought itself into compliance with the doctrine, the FCC argued that Meredith had not suffered, nor was it likely to suffer, any injury in fact from the FCC's application of fairness. 70 The second case, while refusing to repeal fairness on its own initiative, heartily endorsed this effort to compel judicial eradication of the doctrine. Noting that the doctrine "generally aggrieves all broadcasters as well as not serving the public interest," the Commission opposed intervenor efforts to dismiss the case on jurisdictional grounds.n The logic of the Commission's curious posturing was purely political. As the FCC's general counsel, Jack Smith, noted at oral argument in Meredith, "we are not talking law school enforcement, legal textbook arguments; we're talking political reality here.'
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In other words, as the D.C. Circuit observed in its Meredith opinion, "[i]t is patently obvious that because of non-legislative expressions of congressional concern, the Commission does not wish to weaken enforcement of the fairness doctrine-at least in the absence of a judicial opinion that directs that course. '' 74 Since Meredith's claim was that the Commission should itself repeal fairness, the FCC argued that Meredith had no standing. That, in the Commission's words, "Meredith makes a persuasive case that the Fairness Doctrine generally aggrieves broadcasters based on serious constitutional questions raised by its operation" was irrelevant; no standing, after all, was no standing. 75 Conversely, since the broadcaster's association sought judicial invalidation of fairness, the Commission supported court action.
The D.C. Circuit would have none of these political shenanigans. In R-TNDA, the court agreed with the intervenors' claim that the 1985 Report did not constitute agency action subject to direct challenge in the D.C. Circuit and, accordingly, dismissed this claim for lack of jurisdiction.
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In Meredith, the court ruled that Meredith "unquestionably ha[ d) standing" since the FCC's fairness finding could be used against Meredith in a license renewal hearing.
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More significantly, the Meredith court took the Commission to task. Writing for the court, Judge Laurence Silberman first blithely observed that the Commission must not have believed fairness was codified when it issued its 1985 Report; "otherwise, it would have been irresponsible for the Commission gratuitously to cast constitutional doubt on a congressional command. "
78 Judge Silberman then attacked the Commission for its political cowardice, observing that "we are aware of no precedent that permits a federal agency to ignore a constitutional challenge to the application of its own policy merely because the resolution would be The FCC may not have asked for the Meredith remand, but they very much welcomed it. With the court order that the FCC resolve constitutional challenges to fairness, the Commission told Congress that it was forced to definitively resolve Meredith's fairness challenge.
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The Commission could not hide its anxiousness to settle the fairness issue. It instituted a rulemaking proceeding to consider the Meredith remand on January 23, 1987, despite the fact that the D.C. Circuit had not yet considered a request for a rehearing en banc. 81 Ironically, the very next month, the FCC also began work on its congressionally assigned task of exploring alternatives to the fairness doctrine. 83 Second, free-standing legislation to codify the doctrine, the Fairness in Broadcasting Act, was put on the legislative "fast track"-introduction in March, hearings in April, completion of House and Senate committee action in May, approval in both houses of Congress and presentment to the President in June. 84 Congress framed its efforts here in terms of good public policy and the reaffirmation of legislative control over broadcasting. Senate Commerce Chair Hollings, when introducing the measure, spoke of the FCC's "astounding," "relentless and misguided vendetta against the Fairness Doctrine." disregard it without any cogent or visible reason .... " 86 Dingell warned that "that kind of action carries with it certain real perils," for "Congress is a very large and immensely powerful, rather slow moving, but absolutely irresistible body when it finally starts moving. " 87 These comments reveal that congressional leadership perceived its institutional prestige to be on the line in the battle over fairness.
These concerns of power overshadowed Congress's assessment of both the constitutional appropriateness of "public trustee" regulations on broadcast speech and the continued viability of Red Lion's constitutional analysis. At the same time, congressional hearings and member statements at conference and on the floor took issue with the Commission's conclusion that fairness squelched the presentation of diverse perspectives of controversial issues and, therefore, no longer served the public interest. "Without the fairness doctrine," as Chairman Dingell put it, "discussion of public affairs could become either one-sided or be reduced to a bland, uniform pablum as broadcasters react to economic pressures from commercial advertisers . . . . " press; broadcasters, instead, are subject to regulations, including content-based restrictions, which are believed to serve, though not proven to serve, the "public interest."
Congress's willingness to put the Commission in its place through fairness legislation did not end the issue, however. White House acquiescence was also necessary. President Reagan, however, strongly opposed fairness and unhesitatingly followed a Department of Justice recommendation that he veto the fairness bill as "antagonistic to the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment. " 90 Reagan's veto message flatly rejected public trustee regulations in favor of full First Amendment rights for broadcasters. "In any other medium besides broadcasting," Reagan contended, "such federal policing of the editorial 86 Following the veto (and Congress's inability to launch a serious override effort), fairness proponents sought to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat by including the fairness doctrine within a $600 billion catch-all spending bill for fiscal year 1988.
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Reagan, however, stood firm. He conditioned his signing of the spending bill on Congress's exclusion of fairness. 95 Congress, to the chagrin of fairness supporters, blinked, and future codification efforts never got off the ground during the Reagan and Bush Administrations. The Commission's opinion, while expected, held a few surprises. Unlike the 1985 Report, which was formally limited to the public interest issue, the 1987 repeal was framed in constitutional terms. This finding went beyond the Meredith remand which noted that "the Commission need not confront [the constitutional] issue" if it finds the doctrine "contrary to the public interest."
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The Commission reached out to decide the constitutional issue for strategic reasons. Knowing that its repeal would be challenged in court, the Commission wanted to set the stage for a court ruling that fairness was unconstitutional. Indeed, to make it impossible for a court to extricate the Commission's public interest determination from its constitutional analysis, Commission General Counsel Diane Killory argued "that any policy justifications are so intertwined with constitutional implications that we cannot separate the two." 100 Such a constitutional ruling would foreclose legislative reform and, equally important, drive a stake into the heart of public trustee regulations.
The 1987 repeal was also surprising because it contained a vitriolic attack of Justice White's Red Lion decision. The Commission was not content to challenge the factual predicates of spectrum scarcity and broadcaster diversity which underlay Red Lion. Although making that argument, the heart of the fairness repeal was a frontal assault on Red Lion's public trustee-rooted differentiation of the print and broadcast press's First Amendment rights. For the Commission, "(t]he reasons for proscribing government intrusion into the editorial discretion of print journalists provide the same basis for proscribing such interference into the editorial discretion of broadcast journalists. The First Amendment was adopted to protect the people.'.w The fairness repeal, without more, would have triggered a ferocious legislative panning of the Commission. In addition to the repeal, the Commission, contrary to its stated understanding with Congress, did not release its congressionally mandated study of alternatives to fairness prior to its resolution of the Meredith remand. Instead, on the day it repealed fairness, it issued its alternatives report, informing Congress that no fairness alternative "is preferable to eliminating [the] doctrine entirely." Congress's response to the Commission's willingness to couple insult with injury was a tirade of unsurpassed venom. The Commission's timing was labelled tricky "in the Nixonian sense," "a thinly veiled attempt to end-run Congress."
103 The Commission's decision on fairness was characterized as "wrongheaded, misguided, and illogical," "unconscionable," "craven," "a plain and simple outrage," "pure nonsense," and "crap. " 104 Finally, relations between Congress and the Commission had deteriorated into "crisis," with the FCC being labelled as "untrustworthy," "totally out of control," and "lickspittles. The FCC's repeal received a better reception in court. Seeking to kill fairness now and forever, the Commission asked the court of appeals to invalidate fairness on both constitutional and public interest grounds.
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In Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, the court granted half of this request, approving the Commission repeal on public interest grounds without considering the constitutional question. 107 That Meredith explicitly invited the Commission to live up to its oath to "defend the Constitution" by passing on the constitutionality of fairness was now irrelevant. Noting that "American courts are not to pass upon a constitutional question ... if there is also some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of," the court "[h]appily" ducked the constitutional question.
108 Under this approach, fairness was indeed repealed but Red Lion remained intact, as did Congress's ability to statutorily mandate fairness. 109 Moreover, this ruling did not call into question the Commission's power to administratively reinstate fairness.
E. Summary
The repeal of the fairness doctrine was the result not of a bold regulatory agency initiative, but of a series of complex political and judicial interactions. Only the wildest speculation on the part of the Commission could have predicted the outcome of the series of court decisions, legislative initiatives, and White House responses. The FCC, however, deserves extraordinary credit (or blame) for pushing the repeal of fairness while simultaneously seeking to avoid a headon confrontation with Congress. In the end, this dual pursuit proved impossible. Congress would not let the FCC have it both ways. For the FCC, once it released the 1985 Fairness Report, a chain of events outside its control had been triggered and there was no going back.
The role of constitutional interpretation in these fairness wars is rather peculiar. The Constitution seemed at once central and ancillary to the resolution of this dispute. The FCC was rather selective in its invocation of the Constitution. Prior to its repeal of fairness, the FCC spoke only of "constitutional doubts" in its 1985 Fairness Report and D.C. Circuit arguments. This constitutional hesitancy, of course, was a function of politics. The FCC and its Chair, Mark Fowler, while opposing fairness, sought an appropriate vehicle for the repeal of fairness with some degree of trepidation.
110 The FCC's solution was for the D.C. Circuit to do the Commission's constitutional dirty work for it. While that tactic did not fully succeed, the Meredith remand created the appropriate setting for the FCC's repeal of fairness.U 1 Once the Commission was set to cross that abyss, it proved quite able to launch a full throttle constitutional attack on fairness. And why not? The constitutional argument was a powerful one, which, with some luck, might be ratified by the D.C. Circuit.
The approaches of Congress and the White House to the constitutional issue were more straightforward. The White House chose not to be an active player in the administration of fairness or other FCC regulatory doctrines. While the White House sometimes "jawbones" administrative agencies, 112 the Reagan White House, while making critical appointments decisions, rarely involved itself in FCC matters. Its involvement, instead, was limited to signing off or vetoing legislative action. On fairness, the President fought off legislative efforts on First Amendment grounds. Congress's involvement was far more pervasive but not very complex. Congress was concerned with power, not the Constitution. The FCC's attack on fairness challenged Congress's domain in two ways. First, the repeal effort was considered a disrespectful end-run around legislative prerogatives. Second, the substance of the challenge called into question the appropriateness of "public trustee" regulations of broadcasting. The House and Senate Commerce Committees, while they could not escape the constitutional dimensions of this challenge, paid attention to the Constitution only so much as was necessary to uphold its prerogatives. As it turns out, that was not too often. For the most part, FCC oversight committees referred to the "public interest," not the Constitution.
The last player in this drama, the courts, were somewhat inconsistent in their invocations of the Constitution. R-TNDA declined to consider the constitutionality of fairness for jurisdictional reasons; Meredith refused to resolve the constitutional issue itself, but encouraged the Commission to consider the constitutionality of fairness on remand; Syracuse Peace Council refused to rule on the constitutional question because of the availability of alternative grounds. Of course, Congress was intensely interested in prohibiting cross-ownership. In July 1985, hearings were held to "underline, underscore, and emphasize to people the importance of concentration and cross-ownership."
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Later that year, language was included in a conference report and a letter was sent to the FCC by its oversight committee "that the cross-ownership rules are vitally important" and that the Commission should review "with greater scrutiny" requests for waivers to the cross-ownership ban.U 8 The Commission, up to a point, heeded these concerns. It elected to put off any challenge to the crossownership rule unless the fairness doctrine was set for repeal. The FCC nonetheless persisted in granting temporary waivers to cross-ownership. Several of these waivers were granted to Rupert Murdoch.
Congress liked neither the FCC's willingness to grant temporary waivers nor Rupert Murdoch. Murdoch, an Australian media mogul who apparently became a U.S. citizen in order to satisfy federal requirements governing his purchase of television stations in New York, Boston, and elsewhere, was described on the Senate floor as "the No. 1 dirt bag owner of any publications or electronic media in this nation," as "someone who arrived here from Australia ... and goes around trying to get us to change the rules," and as a "sneaky operat [ Congress struck back at both Murdoch and the Commission. It enacted a limitation rider for fiscal year 1988 prohibiting the FCC "to repeal, to retroactively apply changes in, or to begin or continue a re-examination of . . . or to extend the time period of current grants of temporary waivers to" the crossownership ban. 124 The rider, for one year at least, killed the FCC re-examination. The rider also blocked the FCC from extending Murdoch's temporary waivers in Boston and New York, both due to expire in the 1988 fiscal year. Since no other temporary waivers were due to expire in 1988, Murdoch was the only person adversely affected by this proviso.
The rider was at once a political masterstroke and an outrage. Fearing a veto threat because of Reagan's strong opposition to the cross-ownership ban/ 25 the rider was quietly inserted at conference by Senators Kennedy and Hollings into the massive fiscal year 1988 spending bill only hours before the 471 page bill was submitted to the Congress for an immediate vote. Its existence was known to members of the FCC's oversight committees and few others. The President, who signed the bill only after pushing out the fairness doctrine, did not know of its existence. Indeed, the "discovery" of the cross-ownership rider did not take place until several days after enactment.
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Congressional leadership embraced the rider, salvaging some small victory after their biting defeat over fairness. In Senate debates subsequent to the enactment of this "sneak attack" limitation rider, Senator Kennedy proclaimed "our unsatisfactory experience with the FCC and the repeal of the fairness doctrine" makes the cross-ownership ban's "emphasis on diversity ... more important than ever." 127 Senator Hollings, in defending his rider spoke in impassioned tones about his oversight Committee's "struggl[e]" with a "runaway animal in the FCC," "an administrative arm of the U.S. Congress," which has nonetheless declared "open season ... in getting rid of nearly any kind of rule and regulation." 128 For Senator Hollings, the cross-ownership rider was reflective of a larger congressional effort to "take [this] administrative body and bring them in line" through limitation riders prohibiting the FCC's reconsideration of favored congressional policies. 129 The supporters of the rider also defended the prohibition on extensions of Murdoch's temporary waivers. Admitting that the resolution was "aimed directly" at Murdoch "to insure ... Publishing 133 Emphasizing that "only" Murdoch could not "seek an extension during the fiscal year," 134 the court concluded that the noextensions rider poorly served Congress's purported goal of preserving the crossownership prohibition. Instead, to protect the cross-ownership rule, the court opined that the FCC should treat initial grants of temporary extensions and extension renewals alike.
The News America case was revealing on several fronts. At one level, there were strong parallels to fairness. The FCC, which disliked both the Murdoch and cross-ownership reconsideration riders, hoped that the D.C. Circuit would strike a blow to cross-ownership. 135 In contrast to the fairness debate, however, the FCC had little latitude to question the riders. By statutorily directing the FCC not to extend temporary waivers, Congress technically compelled the Commission to defend Murdoch's challenge. 136 Perceiving itself a prisoner of war forced to denounce its homeland, the Commission's solution to this dilemma 130 (Feb. 13, 1988) . The prohibition on the FCC's reexamination of the cross-ownership rule was not directly at issue in News America. Murdoch's challenge was limited to the temporary extension prohibition. The FCC, however, obliquely noted in its brief that "[t)he number of media outlets available to a viewer in a given market might well be a relevant factor in a reevaluation of whether the cross-ownership rule continues to be necessary to further the public interest, if the Commission were able and willing to undertake such a was to offer a weak defense to the temporary extension rider at issue in News America. The Commission's brief conceded that the statute was sustainable only under rational basis scrutiny because "Congress might have been able to pass a bill that better addressed its fears," "premised" its defense of the rider "on the assumption that the rider was not impermissibly focused on [Murdoch,)" and "acknowledged that the legislative history contains conflicting statements" on this question. 137 When News America was decided in March 1988, the Commission "applauded" its defeat. "The Court by this decision," FCC Chair Dennis Patrick said, "has demonstrated that the Congress does not have a free hand in the regulation of the broadcast press." 138 .
News America, like the fairness debate, also highlighted the crucial role played by the D.C. Circuit in this area. The conclusion that the temporary extension rider was purposefully limited to Murdoch was debatable; appropriations riders are necessarily limited to a single fiscal year making Murdoch "a legitimate class of one" subject to Congress's broader concern of foreclosing repeated temporary extensions.
139
Comments by rider sponsors, admittedly, cast doubt on this assertion; the choice, however, was for the D.C. Circuit to make. That it chose to strike down an arguably constitutional act of Congress provides a glimpse into its self-designated status as a player in administrative policymaking.
140
The epilogue to the News America decision also distinguishes cross-ownership from fairness. On cross-ownership, Congress lost this skirmish but won the larger battle. Murdoch sold his papers rather than prolong his personal war. The FCC elected not to prolong its battle over cross-ownership in subsequent fiscal years. v RED LION REDUX: THE FCC's FAILED CHALLENGE TO RACE PREFERENCES The power of the judiciary and the executive to settle constitutional disputes between the Congress and the FCC was again evidenced in FCC efforts to examine the constitutional propriety of race and other preferences. Unlike fairness, where the courts and the White House prompted and protected FCC repeal efforts, the judiciary and the executive ultimately weighed in on the side of race preferences. Left on its own, the FCC could not overcome congressional support for race preferences. The story of FCC race preferences was far more complicated, and far more bizarre than the above snapshot suggests. While Congress's support for race preferences did not waiver, the courts, the executive, and the FCC each flipflopped so much on this question that it was impossible to know what was up and what was down until the Supreme Court's 1991 affirmation of FCC race preferences in Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC-a case, incidentally, whose precedental future is clouded in uncertainty. 141 The only way to unscramble this story is to pay attention to politics and personalities, not constitutional interpretation.
A. Background: The Rise of Diversity Preferences
The source of the FCC's preference was neither the Congress, the Commission, nor the White House. Rather, the D.C. Circuit ordered the FCC to provide a comparative preference to racial minorities in order to serve program diversity objectives. Perceiving that "minority ownership is likely to increase diversity of content," the race preference was deemed integral to the FCC's responsibility to promote the "public interest" through its awarding of broadcast licenses.
142
The D.C. Circuit Court's 1973 decision, TV 9 Inc. v. FCC, was an appeal of the FCC's refusal to value minority status in according a broadcast license. The Nixon Commission's position was that "the Communications Act, like the Constitution, is color blind. What the Communications Act demands is service to the public ... and that factor alone must control the licensing processes, not the race, color or creed of an applicant." 143 In other words, the FCC rejected the minority ownership-diversity programming nexus in 1973.
Through a certiorari petition filed by Solicitor General Robert Bork, the FCC sought Supreme Court review of TV 9. Despite FCC claims that minority preferences "raise the most serious constitutional questions" and that the appellate court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the Commission/44 the Supreme Court refused to hear the case. 145 The Commission accordingly instructed its administrative law judges to afford comparative merit to applicants when minority owners were to participate in the operation of the station.
Program diversity was the exclusive concern of the D.C. Circuit in TV 9.
146
In 1977, however, reports prepared for the FCC Conference on Minority Ownership revealed that a "systematic series of barriers imped[ ed] minority ownership," including FCC broadcast allocation policies that effectively favored nonminority concerns.
147
In 1978, an FCC Taskforce Report found "the underrepresentation of minorities in the ownership of broadcast stations" to be "a direct result of the general societal discrimination." 148 President Carter echoed his appointees' concerns, pointing to "discrimination and exclusion in the past" as largely responsible for minority underrepresentation in broadcasting. 149 For the White House, the TV 9 comparative hearing preference was not enough. It successfully lobbied the FCC both to provide tax breaks to broadcasters who sold their stations to minority owners and to allow broadcasters, whose qualifications had been called into question and otherwise could not sell their stations, to sell their licenses at "distress sale" prices to FCCapproved minority enterprises. 150 While the stated purpose of these May 1978 regulations was "to provide a more diverse selection of programming," 151 the Carter FCC preference appeared to be a merger of remedial and diversity concerns. Specifically, because the underrepresentation of minority owners was attributable to societal discrimination, the FCC had to remedy that discrimination to achieve program diversity.
The constitutionality of race preferences was never seriously considered in either the D.C. Circuit's establishment of the comparative preference in TV 9 or in the White House-prodded FCC extension of race preferences in 1978. TV 9 simply noted that the FCC may advance the public interest by "consider[ing] factors which do not find expression in constitutional law." 152 "Inconsistency with the Constitution," the court proclaimed without further elaboration, "is not to be found in a view of our developing national life which accords merit to Black [applicants] ." 153 The Carter proposal and FCC policy statement did not even pay lip service to the Constitution. The absence of any reference to equal protection concerns is striking, for the Supreme Court's consideration of Board of Regents of the University of California v. Baake had sparked a heated national debate on the constitutionality of affirmative action. 154 Congress seemed equally uninterested in the Constitution when it enacted legislation in 1981 authorizing the FCC to grant licenses through a lottery. In [Vol. 56: No. 4 order to encourage broadcast diversity through inclusion of a variety of underrepresented groups, including labor unions and community organizations as well as women and minorities, the legislation required the FCC to grant these groups significant preferences.
155
That profound First Amendment, due process, and equal protection concerns were raised by this enactment did not trouble Congress. 156 In conference, the lottery provision was added to a catch-all spending bill without any consideration of these constitutional concerns.
The 1981 FCC (chaired by Mark Fowler) refused to implement the statute, in part, because of these constitutional concerns. Although supportive of lottery legislation, the Commission perceived that Congress, not just the Commission, must find that minorities and women have suffered from discrimination.
157
Congress quickly and without acrimony responded to these constitutional concerns. Knowing that the Commission supported the lottery legislation, Congress viewed the FCC's concerns as legitimate and not a constitutional smoke screen. A second lottery statute was enacted in 1982, which, like the Local Public Works Act set-aside approved in Fullilove v. Klutznick, limited the diversity preferences to "Blacks, Hispanics, American Indians, Alaska Natives, Asians, and Pacific Islanders."
158 Furthermore, the conference report accompanying the bill specified that the racial designation was responsive to the conferees' finding "that the effects of past inequities stemming from racial and ethnic discrimination have resulted in a severe underrepresentation of minorities in the media of mass communications .... " 159 The dropping of the gender designation was not explained, although the conferees cryptically noted that women, labor unions, etc., would receive a preference "if they meet the eligibility guidelines. " raised by the Department of Justice, affirmative action demands that had earlier been dropped in conference in order to secure Republican Senate leadership support.
B. From Steele to Bush
Commission support for diversity preferences underwent a sea change in 1984. The triggering event was a challenge to the FCC's awarding of comparative gender preferences, a practice that began in 1978 when the Commission's Review Board concluded that TV 9's emphasis on diversity of viewpoint based on group status extended to gender as well as race. 164 The gender preference scheme was never formally endorsed and not especially beloved, and the FCC proved it an ineffective defense in Steele v. FCC. The Commission's brief cited but never discussed studies of stereotypical portrayals of women in the broadcast media; noted that women were "significantly underrepresented in their ownership of telecommunication facilities" but did not refer to a 1982 study highlighting female underrepresentation; discussed this 1982 study to explain the "potential for abuse" in gender preferences because many "female owners of TV stations are the wives of other station owners"; and distinguished race from gender preferences because "women have not been excluded from 'the mainstream of society' to the same extent as racial and ethnic minorities." 165 The Commission, in short, failed to make a convincing case for the necessity of a gender preference to allow grossly underrepresented female broadcasters to counteract the negative stereotyping of women perpetuated by the maledominated media. The FCC, instead, argued that it was "rational for the Commission to conclude that the increased participation of women ... would enhance diversity of viewpoint and diversification of ownership." Chastising the Commission for its "questionable" and "offensive" "presumption" that more women broadcasters would increase program diversity without "offer[ing] any evidence other than statistical underrepresentation," Judges Edward Tamm and Antonio Scalia depicted the gender preference as an "experiment in social engineering conceived seemingly by whim and rationalized by conclusive dicta." It is difficult to know whether the Steele brief was purposefully ineffective. What is clear is that the Commission was poised to rescind its awarding of race and gender preferences in broadcast licensing. That is the inescapable conclusion of the Commission's surprising response to the D.C. Circuit's en bane vacating of the panel decision in Steele. In vacating Steele on its own initiative and requesting that the FCC file a supplemental brief on the constitutionality of the gender preference, the D.C. Circuit invited the FCC to defend the preference before a more sympathetic en bane hearing. 169 The Commission, in September 1986, declined this invitation; it simultaneously filed both a brief contending that its "current policy of granting race and gender preferences conflicts with constitutional standards" and a motion to remand so that it could determine whether it could establish a nexus between the preference scheme and enhanced diversity above and beyond the "diversity of programming and viewpoint" produced by "market forces."
170
The Commission's assertion that it "closely examined the [race and gender] preference scheme, pursuant to the Court's request, and concluded that it fails to pass constitutional muster as a tool to enhance diversity" 171 enraged Congress. Within one month of the Commission's remand request, and one week of the court's granting that request, all five Commissioners and their general counsel were the subject of "rather unpleasant" 172 hearings. Congressman John Bryant (D-TX) characterized it as "almost pointless" to work with the Commission; Congressman Mickey Leland (D-TX) referred to the need to draft "FCC proof' legislation as well as the need to "fight this Commission tooth and nail" on civil rights; and Congressman Edward Markey (D-MA) labelled the reexamination "a cloudburst in a storm of suspicion and distrust which seems to hover over this Commission."
-
The Commission's efforts to justify the Steele remand by claiming "to be bound by the Constitution" and the corresponding necessity "to visit upon the American people ... an analytically sound decision" 174 were flatly rejected as "legalistic gobbledy gook," "a lot of esoteric, intellectual, whatchamacallit." 175 "That legal stuff invades my intelligence," said Leland, who claimed instead, that the FCC has a "responsibility to the humanity of all citizens of this country."
176
The Congress, with a distaste for the Commission's legalistic arguments, accused 169 the FCC of hiding behind adverse court rulings of its own making. Congressman Allen Swift (D-WA), pointing to FCC action on fairness, cable "must carry" rules, and diversity, stated, "I simply do not understand how the FCC can go into court and fail to present the best possible argument. . . . It seems to me that if you don't like these policies, you should have the guts to change them ... and you should send lawyers down to court who will defend them-not take dives."m The failure of the FCC to defend its preference scheme when invited to do so by the en bane panel in Steele, as well as the FCC's decision to reconsider its comparative race preference scheme in the context of a gender preference challenge, leaves little doubt that the Commission sought to transform the Steele dismissal into a principled justification for a complete reexamination of all diversity preferences.
178 Indeed, to preempt a possible D.C. Circuit ruling upholding diversity preferences, the FCC also sought remand of a related challenge to the race-specific distress sale policy. Angry members of the House Energy and Commerce Committee responded to this action by writing to the Commission that "[g]iven that Congress has found a 'nexus' does exist, the FCC is not free to represent to the court that such a finding has not been made, or that [the] agency's findings are anything other than views that are superseded by the findings of Congress."
179
The FCC was oblivious to these congressional demands disguised as ruminations. Already at war with the Congress over fairness, the FCC perceived that it had little political capital to lose by going forward with its market-oriented challenge to diversity preferences. On December 30, the Commission launched a full-blown inquiry into the sensibility of all diversity preferences on both constitutional and public policy grounds.
180
Like the Fairness Report, this inquiry would have provided the empirical foundations for the Commission's final action on diversity. Also, as in the fairness debate, the constitutional and policy questions were linked. Unless the preferences served diversity, the preferences failed under both public interest and constitutional criteria. directed otherwise by a court, or whether it must independently assess the constitutional issues." 182 The FCC's direct attack on legislative factfinding was too much for Congress. Senator Lautenberg (D-NJ), in introducing legislation to codify diversity preferences, complained that "[t]he FCC seems to think that it can put itself above the Congress and above the courts." 183 Rather than enacting this legislation, however, Congress settled on a limitation rider prohibiting the expenditure of funds "to repeal, to retroactively apply changes in, or to . . . continue a reexamination of the rules of the Federal Communications Commission" regarding expanding minority and women ownership of broadcasting licenses. 184 The Senate report accompanying this rider noted that the FCC reexamination was "unwarranted" and that the Congress "has found that promoting diversity of ownership of broadcast properties satisfies important public policy goals. " 185 President Reagan did not blink when he signed this provision as part of the 1987 catch-all spending bill. Although the President had earlier threatened to veto that bill if it contained fairness provisions, the White House was not at all exercised over race and gender preferences. That Reagan signed the FCC funding ban should come as no surprise. The gains from vetoing the funding ban were few and the costs enormous. 186 Unlike fairness, the broadcasting industry did not oppose the preferences. The funding ban, moreover, was a one year measure that might be judicially struck down as a result of ongoing constitutional challenges. With no apparent gains, there was little incentive for the President to wage war with powerful civil rights interests. This is especially true since Ronald Reagan did not philosophically oppose race preferences as he did content restrictions on broadcasters. Despite all of his campaign rhetoric, Reagan did little to stand in the way of affirmative action. 187 Granted, his Justice Department vigorously opposed race preferences; however, outside of court, the Administration left in place several of its predecessor's most controversial programs and policies. The Administration, moreover, was outspoken in its support of set-aside programs designed to increase minority business ownership.188
The FCC funding ban, while drafted by the Congress and approved by the President, did not, of course, foreclose judicial review of the diversity preferences. By forbidding FCC reexamination of the diversity preference, however, the rider forced the Reagan FCC, under Patrick, to defend the Carter-era initiatives. The FCC did so, portraying the program as an appropriate mechanism to advance First Amendment diversity concerns. The FCC declined to make the argument that the preference could also be supported as a remedial measure. Instead, the Commission maintained that its "goal in implementing the preferences policy has not been to remedy discrimination against minorities or to provide remedial benefits." 189 The commission was not bothered that its eschewing of remedial concerns made its argument constitutionally suspect; the rider did not mandate that diversity preferences be defended "at all costs." 190 With the election of George Bush, however, the FCC once again changed its position on race preferences. President Bush, seeking to normalize relations between the FCC and Congress, distanced himself from the Reagan Administration. His three FCC appointees, Alfred Sikes, Sherrie Marshall and Andrew Barnett, all expressly supported the use of preferences in the awarding of broadcast licenses during their confirmation hearings. 191 Before the Supreme Court, moreover, the Commission argued that diversity preferences served "the compelling governmental interests of promoting diversity in broadcast programming and remedying discrimination." 192
C. The Metro Broadcasting Decision
The constitutionality of the FCC's awarding of distress sale and comparative hearing preferences to racial minorities ultimately made its way to the Supreme Court in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC. 193 Before the Court, the Congress, the FCC, and the Department of Justice ("DOJ") each offered their competing institutional perspectives. Distrustful of FCC representation, the Congress, through the Senate's Office of Legal Counsel, separately argued that the preferences were legislatively mandated and intended "to overcome past inequities and to advance a legitimate public interest in diversity of programming."194 The FCC advanced identical arguments. However, the Bush DOJ opposed the FCC in Metro Broadcasting. Characterizing the diversity preference as "precisely the type of racial stereotyping that is anathema to basic constitu-LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 56: No. 4 tional principles," the DOJ's arguments in Metro were indistinguishable from Reagan Administration attacks on race preferences. 195 Nonetheless, rather than exercise his power as sole government litigator before the Supreme Court in FCC licensing cases, Bush's Solicitor General Kenneth Starr allowed the FCC to serve as the government's principal voice in the case. 196 Why the Bush administration, through the DOJ and the FCC, presented conflicting arguments before the Supreme Court is unclear. One explanation is that the President was caught between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, his desire to stabilize FCC-Congress relations necessitated formal FCC support for the program. On the other hand, his ostensible opposition to race preferences also demanded a formal repudiation of the program.
By a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court sided with the Congress and the Commission, upholding FCC race preferences in Metro Broadcasting. In approving these programs, the Court did not demand a finding that the preferences would remedy particularized discrimination by the FCC. The Court, moreover, did not think it significant that the preferences were responsive to societal discrimination which limited opportunities for minority broadcasters. Concluding that deference was owed Congress's employment of race because of its "institutional competence as the national legislature," Metro Broadcasting found it unnecessary to employ a remedial constraint. 197 Instead, the Court held that "benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress-even if those measures are not 'remedial' .. . -are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."
198
Under this standard of review, the Court had little difficulty upholding the FCC plan. First, although the funding ban did not statutorily mandate diversity preferences, the Court concluded that Congress "has made clear its view that minority ownership policies advance the goal of diverse programming." 199 Second, referring to a slew of cases upholding FCC regulation of broadcasters to ensure the "widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources," the Court found broadcast diversity "at the very least" an important governmental objective.
200 Third, although neither Congress nor the FCC ever sought to prove the nexus between minority ownership and diversity broadcasting, the Court noted that "[w]ith respect to this 'complex' empirical question, we are required to give 'great weight to the decisions of Congress and the experience of the Commission. "'
201
The Metro Broadcasting Court's approval of the FCC preference shocked the Congress, the Commission, and the Solicitor General's office. 202 After the Court's 1989 Richmond v. Croson 203 decision, there was reason to think that a firm conservative majority dominated the Court on the race preference issue.
204
The real surprise of Metro Broadcasting, however, was not its outcome. Prior cases amply supported the federal government's use of race to remedy societal discrimination.2°5 Accordingly, the FCC and the U.S. Senate, in briefs filed before the Court, characterized the preference as a congressionally mandated remedy_2IJ6 The Court did not travel this paved road. Instead, it elected to make the focus of its inquiry the nonremedial objective of promoting program diversity through increasing minority ownership.
The key to this mystery is Justice Byron White. White, who had earlier demanded that race preference programs both satisfy strict scrutiny review and remedy proven discrimination, provided the critical fifth vote in Metro Broadcasting. 201 White, however, was also the author of Red Lion and held strong beliefs about the continued correctness of that decision. Whether White was personally offended by FCC efforts to publicly repudiate one of his most important decisions is unknown. What is known is that White hinged his Metro Broadcasting vote on the Court's adoption of a diversity rationale. According to Justice William Brennan's personal records and conversations between Brennan and his biographer Stephen Wermiel, White refused to sign onto a Brennan-drafted opinion upholding the preferences on remedial grounds and insisted that the majority base its opinion on Red Lion's endorsement of diversity-based broadcast regulation. 
D. Summary
Metro Broadcasting's approval of the FCC preferences was a dramatic chapter in a twenty-five-year story of confrontational and often acrimonious exchanges between the courts, the Congress, the White House, and the FCC. Metro also reveals that the courts played the dominant role in this drama: first by ordering race preferences in TV 9, next by raising doubts about the FCC preferences in Steele, and finally by reaffirming the FCC preferences in Metro.
The FCC certainly recognized this judicial role. Rather than question the constitutionality of preferences on its own initiative, the FCC waited for some judicial signal. Once that signal was delivered, the Fowler FCC tried to replicate its fairness strategy to strike down the preferences. Unlike fairness, however, Congress enacted a limitation rider which preempted FCC factfinding and forced the FCC to defend the preferences in court. The key to this legislative victory was the Reagan White House's willingness to approve preferences. Clearly, had the White House opposed preferences with the same vehemence that it opposed fairness, the FCC would have been able to administratively repeal the preference program by dispelling the presumption that race preferences provide greater program diversity than unregulated market forces.
The FCC's unwillingness to advance its constitutional claims without the shibboleth of a court mandate proved its undoing. Congress was able to launch an effective counteroffensive before the FCC could accomplish its desired objective. Congress's counterattack also reveals that the legislature was disinterested in the "gobbledy gook" of constitutional arguments. Although rightly distrusting the FCC, Congress had no interest in assessing the race preference-broadcast diversity nexus and, with it, the constitutional soundness of the diversity program. Congress's sole concern was protecting a program it supported and reasserting its power over the FCC.
The saga of FCC race preferences again reveals that constitutional interpretation often runs a poor second to political reality. The FCC was circumspect in its invocation of the Constitution. The Congress seemed unconcerned with the Constitution. The Reagan and Bush White Houses offered conflicting constitutional messages-arguing against preferences in court while supporting preferences through legislation and administrative appointments.
VI FINALE: JUDGE THOMAS AND GENDER PREFERENCES
The most surprising chapter in FCC-congressional relations is the demise of gender preferences in the granting of broadcast licenses. Following Metro Broadcasting, the fate of gender preferences seemed secure. Congressional action preserving FCC race preferences, so important to Metro's validation of race preferences, applied with equal force to gender preferences. Moreover, Bush's FCC appointees accepted gender preferences and would rather have defended these preferences than do battle with Congress over them. In the topsy-turvy world of communications policymaking, however, things do not play ownership-diversity nexus in its reexamination of race and gender preferences. 217 The Supreme Court was also not immune from Lamprecht (perhaps because its author, who technically sat on both the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court when the opinion was issued, recognized that the Metro decision's precedental force was limited by his presence on the Court). Rather than reassert the Metro decision's emphasis on the "overriding significance" of congressional action and findings, Lamprecht cited out of context language in Metro that courts ought not to '"defer to the judgment of Congress and the Commission on a constitutional question. "' 218 Lamprecht's demand that the diversity nexus must stand on hard evidence and not presumptive analysis was not unreasonable, but it was at odds with Metro. With Congress and the FCC ostensibly behind the preference, a Supreme Court appeal and nexus-affirming factfinding at both the Commission and the Congress certainly seemed in order. Lamprecht, however, remains intact. No judicial, administrative, or legislative efforts have been launched to restore gender preferences. The explanation is that gender preferences lack a powerful proponent. While neither Congress nor the Commission would repeal these preferences, there is little interest in fighting for their reinstatement in the face of an adverse court ruling.
The source of the gender preference, a 1978 FCC review board decision, was never ratified by the Commission; instead, the Commission ruled that women should receive a downgraded comparative hearing preference.
219 The Commission, moreover, refused to extend distress sale and tax certificate preferences to women, concluding that they have not suffered discrimination "of the same order" as racial minorities.
22° Commission complacency as to the plight of female underrepresentation was also revealed in FCC opposition to legislatively specified gender preferences in the first lottery statute. In direct contradiction to its diversity-based comparative hearing preference, the FCC attacked the validity of gender preferences "not enacted as compensation for past discrimination. "
221 After Congress dropped the gender specification in its second lottery statute, the Commission concluded that women did not meet alternative eligibility requirements without the benefit of a factfinding proceeding. 222 The FCC never launched such a factfinding effort. The story of FCC rulemaking in this area is one of indifference. Most Commission efforts were directed at limiting the reach of gender preferences, suggesting, as former Commissioner Glen Robinson put it, that the Commission considers these preferences a "nuisance. "
223
Congress also seemed ambivalent about gender preferences. While including gender in the first lottery statute, Congress did not blink at dropping the gender specification in the second lottery statute in order to preserve race preferences.224 Congress's outrage at the FCC's reexamination of its diversity preferences likewise focused on the preservation of race preferences. In both instances, Congress appeared somewhat sympathetic to gender preferences, but far more interested in race preferences. Interest group politics played a large role in explaining this differential treatment. Minority broadcasters are a well organized, powerful lobby which is on record opposing preference points for "white women applicants." 225 Women broadcasters are disorganized with relatively little political influence. 226
Congress's and the FCC's passivity in the face of Lamprecht is readily understandable in the context of past legislative and administrative action. By not seeking en bane review of Lamprecht, the Commission appeared comfortable with the defeat of gender preferences. The FCC, therefore, had nothing to gain by launching a factfinding effort or requesting Supreme Court review of Lamprecht. Moreover, Congress had little incentive to pressure the FCC to seek Court review or undertake a factfinding hearing. An FCC unsympathetic to gender preferences was unlikely to substantiate the ownership-diversity nexus.
227 Supreme Court review, furthermore, risked the overturning of Metro Broadcasting and, with it, race preferences. Aside from these disincentives, the FCC's oversight committees also had an agenda, too crowded to deal with the peripheral concern of gender preferences. 228 Gender preferences died a sudden, unexpected, and quiet death at the hands of the D.C. Circuit. Aside from Clarence Thomas's participation in the case, Lamprecht may have gone by unnoticed, despite the fact that Lamprecht undermines a landmark Supreme Court ruling, and declares unconstitutional a congressionally mandated and FCC-approved preference scheme. FCC, congressional, or interest group support, the gender preference issue was politically unimportant. The questionable intrusion of a federal court into legislative and administrative affairs did not raise the stakes. The bottom line was not constitutional prerogatives, but specific policy outcomes.
VII SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION
Fairness, cross-ownership, and diversity preferences are stories of power. Each of these battles reflected two fundamental challenges launched by the Fowler and Patrick Commissions to Congress's authority over broadcasting. First, the FCC raised doubts about public trustee regulations rooted in spectrum scarcity. Pointing both to technological advances and the longstanding economic argument that the "price mechanism ... allocates resources to users without the need for government regulation,"
229 the Commission advocated the substitution of marketplace solutions for existing regulations. Second, in challenging the legislatively favored regulatory regime, the Commission questioned Congress's power both to regulate broadcasting and to govern the Commission. Congress neither appreciated nor tolerated these broadsides. Rather, it badgered the Commission with angry letters and oversight hearings, and sought to stymie Commission initiatives through appropriations riders and, where necessary, freestanding legislation.
The political battles between the FCC and the Congress were unusually fierce but, in the context of the Reagan Administration's broader attack on the administrative state, not unusual. What sets these battles apart is the paramount role played by constitutional interpretation in their resolution. The FCC's free market challenge to public trustee regulation rejected the scarcity based distinction between the broadcast and print press and, with it, the presumption that government regulation yields greater broadcast diversity than do market forces. With that said, the Constitution did not figure prominently in either the FCC's regulatory challenge or Congress's counterattack. Constitutionalism was of only incidental importance to the Congress and the Commission, as baggage which necessarily accompanied free market attacks on, and public trustee justifications of, broadcast regulation.
The forms that constitutional arguments took bespeaks their secondary status. The FCC did not think constitutional arguments were sufficiently different from "public interest" claims to risk the wrath of Congress by repealing disfavored regulations as constitutionally infirm. Initial constitutional doubts about the fairness doctrine and cross-ownership lay on the periphery while the FCC questioned whether these regulations served the "public interest. 230. In News America, the FCC-smarting from its fight with Congress over fairness-went so far as to say that only reexamination of cross-ownership would be limited to the "public interest" issue and not correlative constitutional concerns. See Corrected Brief for the FCC, supra note 135, at 21 n.6. preferences were never depicted as constitutionally suspect until gender preferences were struck down by the Steele panel decision. The FCC, put simply, did not see its oath to defend the Constitution adequate to the task of justifying its repeal of troublesome regulations.
The Commission's lack of constitutional fortitude is readily understandable. It was considered politically impossible to fight Congress on every matter with which the Commission preferred deregulation to regulation. The risk of political fallout was just too great. These risks were heightened by the FCC's independent agency status. Lacking the authority or prestige of a co-equal branch, the Commission felt constrained to challenge the constitutionality of programs that were congressionally approved but not statutorily mandated.
Congress, moreover, placed greater demands on the Commission to follow its lead, precisely because the Commission was deemed an "arm of Congress," not part of the executive.
The Commission, in certain respects, operated within these constraints. It never sought to constitutionally repeal congressionally favored programs without some signal from the courts. In other words, rather than take the political heat for Commission-initiated constitutional repeals, the FCC sought political shelter in court edicts. The Commission's challenge then was to create the circumstances in which the courts would raise doubts about the constitutionality of disfavored programs. On fairness, the Commission called the doctrine into question with its 1985 Report and invited the courts to come in for the kill with its arguments in Meredith and R-TNDA. On cross-ownership and diversity preferences, the Commission appeared to have set the stage for judicial invalidation through its questionable advocacy in News America and Steele.
The D.C. Circuit-albeit with several caveats-assisted the Commission in its efforts. Meredith set in motion the fairness repeal; Steele prompted the reexamination of race and gender preferences. There is no doubt that the Commission sought to capitalize on these technically adverse rulings. Remand proceedings were launched in Meredith before the intervenor's request for en bane review was denied. More significantly, the en bane vacating of Steele did not prompt the Commission to defend gender preferences; instead, the FCC argued the necessity of its reexamination of all diversity preferences. This Steele inspired reexamination is all the more striking, since the Steele panel found the "Commission's authority to adopt minority preferences ... clear." important thing on Commerce." 233 For these members of Congress, Commission retorts to the Constitution were deemed "legalistic gobbledy gook. " 234 Indeed, the Commission was accused of cowardice for "tak[ing] dives" in court so that it could bootstrap its deregulatory agenda to court decisions. Congress's intolerance for the niceties of constitutional analysis is also reflected in the enactment of limitation riders preventing the FCC from assessing the constitutional wisdom of cross-ownership and diversity preferences through factfinding.
This discounting of constitutional analysis reveals the obvious: The principal concerns of the FCC's overseers was the preservation of their favored policies and their authority. By the same token, when its institutional priorities or prestige was not on the table, Congress did not rise in arms to oppose constitutional interpretations with which it disagreed. For example, since the FCC supported its objectives, Congress readily responded to constitutional objections raised by the FCC to the first lottery statute. Congress's failure to respond to Lamprecht is another example. It did not matter that Lamprecht struck down legislatively mandated gender preferences, since Congress was not threatened by the decision. Gender preferences were conscientiously defended by the FCC and were without a strong advocate in Energy and Commerce. In sharp contrast, Congress's power over the FCC was challenged by the repeal of fairness, the granting of a temporary waiver to Murdoch, and the Steele reexamination. Congress, unable to strongarm the FCC through hearings, letters, and other oversight techniques, was forced to respond to these perceived power grabs through legislation codifying fairness and constraining FCC efforts to repeal diversity preferences and cross-ownership.
Congress's reliance on legislation to check the FCC thrust the White House into this conflict. On fairness, President Reagan sided with his Justice Department and Commission appointees, successfully fighting off codification on First Amendment grounds. On diversity preferences, however, Reagan parted company from Justice Department court arguments and signed appropriations measures restricting FCC reexamination. This selective attentiveness to constitutional concerns is readily understandable in personal and political terms. Reagan, a former broadcaster, cared much more about content-based fairness restrictions than some idealized color-blind constitution. The political costs of upsetting civil rights interests when a pending court decision might well strike down diversity preferences, moreover, did not warrant a veto of the reexamination funding ban.
The president, of course, plays a much larger role in defining the contours of the "constitutional dialogues" between Congress and the Commission than by simply signing or vetoing legislation. The president appoints the FCC's 233. ld. 234. See Steele Hearings, supra note 175, at 55. As one Energy and Commerce staffer explained, "[rather than] getting bogged down in fruitless debate over the possible constitutionality of the bills before them [,] [t]he Energy and Commerce Committee is quite willing to take chances on passing possibly unconstitutional legislation." Quoted in Miller, supra note 2, at 24. commissioners. Reagan's impact is best revealed in a letter signed by former commissioners attacking his appointees' repeal of fairness. Bush's impact, in contrast, is evidenced by his appointment of Commissioners who disavowed their predecessors' constitutional attacks on race and gender preferences in order to curry favor with their Congressional overseers. Ironically, Bush's Solicitor General (and former D.C. Circuit judge) Kenneth Starr kept faith with political conservatives and battled the Bush Commission before the Supreme Court. That Bush appointees-representing different constituencies-opposed each. other in Metro Broadcasting, once again, reveals the primacy of politics over constitutional interpretation.
Metro Broadcasting also reveals that the kingpin in the struggle between free market deregulation and public trustee regulation is neither the FCC, the Congress, nor the executive. It is the judiciary. Rather than the Supreme Court, however, the pivotal judicial player is the D.C. Circuit. All FCC rulemaking and licensing decisions are subject to D.C. Circuit review. Consequently, the D.C. Circuit has evolved into a judicial overseer of the FCC. The persistence of D.C. Circuit intervention is revealed in the frequency with which that court reverses or remands FCC action. According to a 1988 Congressional Research Service memorandum, the D.C. Circuit, from January 1986 to January 1988, rejected Commission arguments in 22 of 88 cases. 235 The D.C. Circuit's activism and political awareness is a constant theme of the battles over fairness, cross-ownership, and diversity preferences. On fairness, the Commission was explicitly accused of playing judicial politics in both TRAC and Meredith. 236 TRAC, moreover, eschewed FCC arguments that fairness was inapplicable to teletext in order to find that fairness was not statutorily mandated. Meredith likewise encouraged the Commission to assess the constitutional wisdom of fairness, despite the fact that the remand could have been framed on narrow public interest grounds. Syracuse Peace Council offered a different type of activism. Rather than decide the constitutional question that Meredith invited, the court rewrote the FCC repeal in order to duck the constitutional question.
The resolution of cross-ownership and diversity preferences was also framed by D.C. Circuit activism. On cross-ownership, News America, reflecting panel members doubts about the constitutionality of cross-ownership, struck down the temporary waiver restriction when it could have easily viewed Murdoch as a legitimate class of one. On race preferences, TV-9 paid short shrift to constitutional concerns in establishing comparative hearing preferences. On gender preferences, Lamprecht severely undermined the Supreme Court's Metro Broadcasting decision in order to invalidate congressionally mandated and FCCapproved preferences. The political and ideological calculations of the FCC, the Congress, the White House, and the courts defined the battles over fairness, cross-ownership, and diversity preferences. Constitutional argumentation played a critical but secondary role in these battles. Ironically, with court decisions and FCC rulings speaking to the constitutionality of diversity preferences and fairness, the constitutional appropriateness of diversity, cross-ownership, and fairness remains up for grabs. Metro Broadcasting and Lamprecht rest their competing holdings on the presence or absence of proof that diversity in ownership spawns diversity in programming.
FCC and/or congressional factfinding can strengthen or undermine the ownership-programming nexus and, with it, the continued correctness of these decisions. The fairness repeal (as well as its probable reinstatement by Congress) also lies on hotly disputed findings about the costs of fairness to program diversity. Finally, the cross-ownership policy relies on the unproven assumption that diversity of ownership yields diversity of programming. This factual predicate is also subject to challenge.
There is a certain appropriateness to this constitutional uncertainty. Battles over fairness, cross-ownership, and diversity preferences were not searches for constitutional truth. These were battles over competing policy visions and the division of power between Congress and the Commission. That these political battles should continue on into the future seems only fitting.
